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POLITICAL POWER AND JUDICIAL POWER:
SOME OBSERVATIONS ON THEIR RELATION
Mark Tushnet*
INTRODUCTION

This Essay summarizes and perhaps extends slightly some important
recent work, mostly by political scientists, on the structural relation
between the array of political power in a nation's nonjudicial branch or
branches and the way in which judicial review is exercised in relatively
stable democracies. Robert Dahl's classic article identified one such
relation. 1 According to Dahl, "[e]xcept for short-lived transitional periods
when the old alliance is disintegrating and the new one is struggling to take
control of political institutions, the Supreme Court is inevitably a part of the
dominant national alliance." 2 What, though, if there is no "dominant"
national political alliance? Can anything systematic be said about the
courts' role during transitional periods? Recent scholarship suggests that
Dahl describes only one part, albeit perhaps a large one, of a more complex
picture.
This Essay draws on that scholarship, dealing with constitutional
adjudication around the world, to describe three patterns of relationship.
Part I describes a form of partisan entrenchment similar to the one Dahl
described. Part II describes a more dynamic form of such entrenchment.
Part III describes a pattern of consensual delegation of policy-making
authority to the courts. 3 A brief conclusion suggests that the type of
analysis in which I engage in this Essay will produce useful insights into
constitutional law and politics if that analysis is extended and elaborated.
Two preliminary comments on method are appropriate. First, sometimes
I use terms suggesting that these patterns result from intentional choices by
politicians and judges. At times the choices are indeed intentional, but at
times they are not. Sometimes the outcomes result from the overall
structures of politics and institutions and the incentives they set up for
* Carmack Waterhouse Professor of Constitutional Law, Georgetown University Law
Center.
1. Robert A. Dahl, Decision-Making in a Democracy: The Supreme Court as a
NationalPolicy-Maker, 6 J. Pub. L. 279 (1957).
2. Id. at 293.
3. I draw the term "partisan entrenchment" from Jack M. Balkin & Sanford Levinson,
Understanding the Constitutional Revolution, 87 Va. L. Rev. 1045 (2001), but give it a
somewhat different meaning.
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politicians and judges. Second, political and institutional structures and
incentives underdetermine behavior, and the patterns I describe will never
capture everything about a constitutional court's behavior. Rather, they
describe central tendencies that appear when political power is arrayed in
specified ways. My discussion may illuminate a fair amount of what
constitutional courts do, but there will be corners, perhaps large ones, the
understanding of which will require different forms of explanation.
I. THE DEEPLY ENTRENCHED PARTISAN COALITION AND JUDICIAL REVIEW
Dahl described the pattern after a political coalition establishes its
dominance.
He argued that the U.S. Constitution's provisions for
nominating and confirming federal judges implied that as new Justices
replaced old ones, the Supreme Court would come to be composed of
Justices whose constitutional vision was compatible with that of the
dominant coalition. 4 Norms of appropriate judicial behavior to match the
dominant coalition's vision are likely to develop as well, if the coalition's
dominance is sustained over a generation or two. The result is that the
constitutional court in such a system routinely ratifies central national
policies, and takes on the governing coalition, if at all, only with respect to
issues at the fringes of the coalition's concerns.
Political scientists describe this pattern from the perspective of elected
officials. These officials are able to enact whatever policies they think
appropriate because of their sustained political dominance. In the absence
of serious electoral challenge, why would they tolerate the existence of an
institution that would do what their electoral opponents cannot-that is,
displace policies important to the dominant coalition? Elected officials
select (and train) constitutional court judges whose constitutional
interpretations will not impede the dominant coalition's policies.
The evidence for this pattern comes from various nations. Sweden's
constitution has provided for judicial review for many years, but the
Swedish Supreme Court has barely exercised its power to invalidate
national legislation. 5 One reason is constitutional text, which authorizes
invalidation of national legislation only if the inconsistency between the
law and the constitution is "manifest."'6 Another reason, though, is the long
dominance of social democratic parties in the Swedish Parliament. 7 A
4. For an example of the way in which different selection mechanisms might affect the
relation between political and judicial power, see infra text accompanying notes 39-41.
5. See Judicial Activism in Comparative Perspective 2 (Kenneth M. Holland ed., 1991)
(noting that as of 1991, "the Supreme Court of Sweden has never found a law of the Riksdag
to be repugnant to the constitution"); E-mail from Eivind Smith, Professor of Constitutional
Law, University of Oslo, to author (Sept. 12, 2006, 03:48 EST) (on file with the Fordham
Law Review) (stating that "the [Swedish] courts have barely exercised [its] power to
invalidate national legislation on Constitutional Grounds" (internal quotations omitted)).
6. Regeringsformen[RF][Constitution]
11:14
(Swed.),
available
at

http://www.riksdagen.se/templates/RPageExtended_ 6328.aspx.
7. It is worth noting that Sweden's membership in the European Union (EU) might
induce a greater degree of judicial invalidation, including invalidation of some laws adopted

2006]

POLITICAL POWER AND JUDICIAL POWER

similar pattern has occurred in Japan. Modeled on the U.S. Constitution,
the Japanese constitution of 1947 provided for judicial review, but the
Japanese Supreme Court has been quite inactive, to the point where its
occasional invalidations of legislative and even administrative policy on
constitutional grounds are the subject of great attention. 8 Here the
explanation seems equally straight-forward--the long domination of
Japanese politics by the Liberal Democratic Party.
In the United States, Dahl accurately describes the Supreme Court during
periods of what Bruce Ackerman calls "normal politics," which occur after
moments of constitutional transformation. 9 Ackerman's description of
alternating periods of constitutional and normal politics, in turn, helps make
sense of the rhythm of judicial review in the United States, with its peaks of
activism during transitional periods and its valleys of restraint during
periods of normal politics.
And yet, the Dahlian perspective seems somewhat flat and lacking
nuance. The reason, I suggest, is that Dahl's contribution came quite early,
and that more recent theoretical developments in the field of American
political development provide the opportunity for an elaboration of Dahl's
insight that preserves its core but allows us to see more complex patterns.
Karen Orren and Stephen Skowronek have given the label "intercurrence"
to the phenomenon that different political orders--or, in the terms I have
used, different constitutional orders-can coexist or at least can overlap,
with some aspects of an older constitutional order persisting after a new
order has come into being.' 0 And, importantly, intercurrence means that
principles inconsistent with the fundamental principles of a new
constitutional order may persist-and so be enforced by the courts--even
as the new order settles in.
Consider here the Supreme Court produced by Franklin Roosevelt's New
Deal. As Kevin McMahon has shown, that Court laid the foundation for the

by the Swedish Parliament under the direction of the EU (that is, resulting from Sweden's
compliance with EU "directives"). The reason is that such laws, though nominally resulting
from decisions by the Swedish Parliament, are in fact the product of decisions made outside
Sweden, and not necessarily by a political coalition similar to that dominant in Sweden itself.
For an example, see http://dsv.su.se/jpalme/society/Ramsbro-HD-domen.html (last visited
Oct. 3, 2006) (providing the Swedish text of a decision of June 12, 2001, partially
invalidating as inconsistent with the Swedish constitution parts of the EU data privacy
directive).
8. See David S. Law, Generic Constitutional Law, 89 Minn. L. Rev. 652, 692 n.142
(2005) (citing sources supporting the proposition that "[iut is consistently observed that
judicial review in Japan is extremely deferential in practice").
9. For Ackerman's terminology, see, e.g., Bruce Ackerman, We the People:
Transformations 265 (1998). For a qualification, see infra text accompanying notes 18-19
(describing the use of judicial review to clean up local "outliers" whose legislation is
inconsistent with the policies of the dominant national coalition).
10. For Orren and Skowronek's term, see Karen Orren & Stephen Skowronek, The
Search for American Political Development 108-18 (2004). For my term, see Mark Tushnet,
The New Constitutional Order 1 (2003) (defining "constitutional order").

FORDHAM LA W REVIEW

[Vol. 75

Warren Court's revolution in civil rights and civil liberties." I Yet,
Roosevelt and those who helped him select Supreme Court Justices were
largely indifferent to, and some were actively hostile to, expansive
interpretations of civil rights and civil liberties. They chose Justices whom
they knew were "reliable" on the issues of national power that centrally
concerned the Roosevelt Administration. As it happened, nearly everyone
who was committed to rejecting the Old Court's vision of limited national
power was also a political liberal.' 2 And, their liberalism found its
grounding in some aspects of the libertarianism that animated the Old Court
itself. On issues of race, for example, the New Deal's progressive Justices
could invoke Buchanan v. Warley, which relied at least in part on property
rights ideas to invalidate municipal ordinances requiring residential
segregation. 13 Substantive due process cases like Meyer v. Nebraska
retained unacknowledged vitality when the New Deal Court began to
develop the idea that legislation differentially affecting fundamental rights
had to receive extremely careful review. 14 And some Justices approached
free speech issues with a libertarian sensibility that drew some of its force
from dissents to statist decisions from the Old Court. Recall here one of my
preliminary qualifications, that the patterns I describe need not result from
intentional choices made by elected officials. That seems clearly true of the
New Deal Court's decisions on civil rights and civil liberties. They were a
by-product of the conscious choice to place supporters of national power
over commerce on the Supreme Court. 15

Finally, it is worth observing that the political scientists' concept of
intercurrence fits nicely with Ackerman's argument that the Supreme
Court's task after constitutional moments have passed is to synthesize the
principles of the new constitutional order with those principles of older
16
orders that retain their vitality.

11. See generally Kevin J. McMahon, Reconsidering Roosevelt on Race: How the
Presidency Paved the Road to Brown (2004). I should note that my account differs on some

matters of detail from McMahon's, but that my account has been strongly influenced by his.
12. The term Old Court refers to the U.S. Supreme Court before 1937. For this usage,
see, e.g., Ackerman, supra note 9, at 280-81.
13. 245 U.S. 60(1917).
14. See Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535 (1942); Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390
(1923).
15. For a related discussion, see Jack M. Balkin & Sanford Levinson, The Processes of
ConstitutionalChange: From PartisanEntrenchment to the National Surveillance State, 75
Fordham L. Rev. 489 [hereinafter Balkin & Levinson, Processesof ConstitutionalChange].

16. For Ackerman's description of the synthetic task, see Bruce Ackerman, We the
People: Foundations 86-94 (1991). I would qualify this observation only by noting that, at
least as elaborated so far, Ackerman's description appears to make permanent the synthetic
enterprise, whereas the concept of intercurrence suggests that the synthetic task lasts only as
long as the principles of the older constitutional order retain some force in some significant
domains.
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II.

POLITICAL RELIANCE ON JUDICIAL REVIEW

Part I has described one way in which a constitutional court can
collaborate with elected officials-by refraining from interpreting the
Constitution to interfere with the implementation of those officials' policy
7
agendas. Other forms of collaboration are possible.'
Consider first a simple possibility, in which there is significant consensus
across party lines--that is, between members of the dominant political
coalition and members of the minority-on some important constitutional
values. Yet, there is some possibility of dissent from that consensus, for
example, by outliers who happen to control one or a few local governments.
Such departures are bothersome to the dominant coalition because they
provide the minority with political opportunities. If the left is in control, for
example, defections to the more extreme left might foster defections to the
right, bringing the minority into power. Or, the minority might gain
political mileage by castigating the dominant coalition for failing to control
its members or, more important, for secretly harboring the ambition to
advance the defectors' policy notwithstanding the dominant coalition's
seeming adherence to the consensus. The dominant coalition might use the
18
courts to discipline--that is, invalidate--these opportunistic defections.
The notion of outliers implicates an additional form of using the courts to
implement the dominant coalition's policy agenda.
Effectively
implementing such an agenda is often difficult. In particular, doing so
might require reaching rather far down into the daily operations of ordinary
public bureaucracies.
The dominant coalition has a choice among
implementation tools.
The courts can be a particularly useful
implementation device for dealing with matters of detail that are hard for
the national legislature or its own bureaucracies to get a handle on. We
could describe the dominant coalition as delegating some aspects of
implementation to the courts, or as allocating policy implementation among
a number of institutions, one of which is the judiciary. 19
Lucas A. Powe's discussion of the Warren Court provides one prominent
example of this sort of delegation or allocation. 20 Powe describes

17. I note one theoretical possibility, although I am aware of no good examples of its
instantiation. A dominant national coalition might use the courts to discipline--that is,
invalidate-opportunistic defections from the coalition's agreements, which might occur
when some component of the coalition sees the chance for a short-term electoral gain from
defection, and the rest of the coalition fears that the defection will lead to the coalition's
collapse and displacement from power.
18. I suspect that an account like that in the text describes a fair amount of the work of
the modem German Constitutional Court, although I have not done sufficient research to be
confident about that judgment.
19. The dominant coalition could use some of its (relatively limited) legislative time to
discipline these outliers, but the courts are an available resource that the coalition can use
instead. Presumably, the implicit calculation is that the coalition gains more by freeing up
time in the legislature than it loses by imposing these mopping-up operations on the courts,
which do lose some time that they might devote to other tasks.
20. Lucas A. Powe, Jr., The Warren Court and American Politics (2000).
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"history's Warren Court"--that is, the Warren Court at its height from 1962
to 1968, as enforcing the national Democratic policy agenda against two
targets. "The geography of constitutional violations [found by the Warren
margin. Then it picks up urban
Court] ... is the South by an overwhelming
21
areas of Catholic dominance."
During "history's Warren Court," the South's values--on matters
relating to race, religion, and criminal justice-were increasingly out of line
with the values held by the central figures in the national Democratic Party.
Powe summarizes the Warren Court's work on the Constitution and race:
"[T]he legal regime of race was nationalized.

.

.

. But the effort was not a

national one. It was directed exclusively at the South and was designed to
22
force the South to conform to northern--that is, national--norms."
Griswold v. Connecticut23 exemplifies legislation in the second target area.

By 1965 only Connecticut, Massachusetts, Rhode Island, and New York
24
had statutes on the books making it an offense to use contraceptives.
Statutory repeals had been thwarted, at least from the perspective of
national Democratic elites, by the undue political influence of the Roman
Catholic Church. Griswold was the national political coalition's way of
bringing these states into line. In Powe's words, "[t]he South was an outlier
on segregation; the Northeast on contraception; and the Court was
25
tolerating no outliers."
Mark Graber's important article, The Nonmajoritarian Difficulty,
identifies another significant form of collaboration between elected
politicians and the courts. 26 Courts discipline outliers in the service of the
dominant national coalition's policy agenda. Graber points out that
sometimes the coalition does not have an agenda with respect to specific
issues that are, nonetheless, important to the coalition's components. The
reason is that the components care about the issue but seek to have it
resolved in opposing ways. If the coalition's leaders seek to advance one
policy approach to the issue, they will fracture their coalition. From the
leaders' point of view, the best solution is to keep the issue out of politics.
Sometimes, though, that is impossible. Graber argues that their second-best
21. Id. at 493.
22. Id. at 490. Powe also observes that "[t]he Court's handful of religion cases
paralleled the geography of the obscenity cases. They were either from the South or from
the arc running from New England through the Middle Atlantic states where laws already on
the books acquired the backing of the local Catholic hierarchies." Id. at 492.
23. 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
24. See Powe, supra note 20, at 376 (referring to Connecticut and "its backward
cousins" in those states).
25. Id. at 372. I should note that the national Democratic Party's policy agenda
combined electoral considerations, such as retaining the support of African-Americans in the
North and perhaps gaining such support from African-Americans in the South, with
ideological ones, such as a commitment to a substantive liberalism that emphasized freedom
of choice with respect to personal matters and the need to control market choices in the

economy.
26. Mark A. Graber, The Nonmajoritarian Difficulty:
Judiciary, 7 Stud. in Am. Pol. Dev. 35 (1993).

Legislative Deference to the
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strategy might be to get someone else to resolve the issue, and then hope
that the resolution will "stick" in a way that allows the electoral coalition to
hold together. Delegating the issue to the courts--that is, to judicial
elites-might be particularly attractive when political elites believe that
they share the views of judicial elites on the issue but are unable to act27on
those views because their constituents (the "base") hold opposing views.
Graber offers two examples. In one, the delegation of the divisive issue
to the courts failed, and in the other it was a partial success. The first
example is the issue of slavery in the 1850s. The Democratic Party was a
rough coalition of Northerners ambivalent at best about slavery and
Southerners deeply committed to its continued existence. Issues related to
slavery kept appearing on the national political agenda, and each time they
did the question of slavery's constitutionality arose and made achieving
solutions to each specific issue more complicated. According to Graber,
Democratic Party strategists welcomed the possibility that the Supreme
Court might be able to take the slavery issue out of politics. On this view,
the communications between members of the Supreme Court and Presidentelect James Buchanan as the Dred Scott case was pending were no accident.
The Justices informed Buchanan that they were about to hold the Missouri
Compromise unconstitutional on the ground that Congress lacked the power
to ban slavery in the western territories, and in his inaugural address
Buchanan appealed to the nation to accept the Court's forthcoming
decision. Of course, because that decision declared unconstitutional the
central plank in the Republican Party platform, thereby appearing to make
the leading opposition party's program unachievable, the delegation of the
issue to the Court may have solved the problems facing the Democratic
Party's leadership in the short run, but only at the cost of tearing the party
and the nation apart a few years later.
Graber's second example is the abortion issue. Here, he argues, both
major parties faced internal divisions. The Democratic Party was a
coalition that included urban Catholics opposed to abortion and members of
the professional middle classes who tended to hold progressive views on the
issue. The Republican Party was a coalition that included Northeastern and
other cosmopolitan business-oriented conservatives and, since the campaign
of Barry Goldwater in 1964, an increasing number of social conservatives.
As abortion-rights activists pressed their issue on to the political agenda
throughout the country, the strategy of delegating the decision to the courts
made sense, Graber argues, to the political leadership of both parties.
This strategy was a partial success. The abortion issue continued to
divide the Democratic Party, but not the Republican Party. The reason was
that the abortion issue mattered a great deal to both components of the
Democratic coalition, but mattered far more to the Republican Party's
conservative base than to its business-oriented component. Further,
27. I place the term "base" in scare-quotes because it is not clear to me that there is any
analytic way of fairly singling out one component of a coalition as the coalition's base.
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Republican leaders could hold their coalition together by blaming the courts
for their failure to deliver a strong anti-abortion policy to the conservative
base. Eventually, of course, the base caught on and insisted on the
appointment of judges whom they hoped would sooner rather than later
make it possible to make abortion illegal again. And, strikingly, as that
strategy took hold, Northeastern Republicans began to rethink their
commitment to the party.
Both examples illustrate one drawback to the strategy of delegating
divisive issues to the courts. The abortion example as seen from the
Republican side shows what can happen when judicial elites take a position
compatible with the views of one portion of the dominant coalition but
incompatible with the views of the coalition's core or base. The strategy
may solve the political problems faced by elected leaders in the short run,
but it can only succeed in the long run if those who lose in the courts accept
that loss. There are pretty clearly no structural reasons for believing that the
losers will do so, and Graber's examples show, at the least, that they have
not always done so. The possibility that delegating divisive issues to the
courts will not take them off the political agenda therefore implies that the
strategy makes sense only for political leaders with a relatively short timehorizon: Such leaders will maintain their power in the short run by
delegating the issue to the courts, and they will not be around to worry
about the political consequences in the longer run.
This observation about politicians' time-horizons helps frame the final
relationship between political power and judicial power that I describe in
this Essay.

III. ATTEMPTED PARTISAN ENTRENCHMENT VIA JUDICIAL REVIEW
DURING TRANSITIONAL PERIODS
Ran Hirschl's recent work on the establishment of judicial review in
stable democracies, and related scholarship, has shown one basic
relationship between political power and judicial power. 28 The story
Hirschl and others tell is this: Consider a political coalition that has been
dominant for a reasonably long period but that comes to foresee that it will
lose electoral control relatively soon. The leaders of that coalition use the
power they still have to entrench in the courts judges who will (a) do what
they can to continue to advance the (soon-to-be-displaced) coalition's

28. Ran Hirschl, Towards Juristocracy: The Origins and Consequences of the New
Constitutionalism (2004) (discussing the adoption of judicial review in four nations in the
late twentieth century). For additional studies contributing to the literature on this version of
partisan entrenchment, see Tom Ginsburg, Judicial Review in New Democracies:
Constitutional Courts in Asian Cases (2003); J. Mark Ramseyer, The Puzzling
(In)Dependence of Courts: A Comparative Approach, 23 J. Legal Stud. 721 (1994)
(discussing Japan); Matthew C. Stephenson, When the Devil Turns ... : The Political
Foundations of Independent Judicial Review, 32 J. Legal Stud. 59 (2003) (developing a
formal model of the process).
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policy agenda, and (b) do what they can to obstruct the implementation of
the former opposition, now dominant, coalition's policy agenda.
The canonical U.S. example of this form of partisan entrenchment is the
Federalists' attempt to pack the federal courts after they decisively lost the
national elections of 1800 but, because of a serious flaw in constitutional
design, retained office for several months. 29 The Federalist Congress and
President John Adams attempted to pack the federal courts by reorganizing
them in a way that created new positions filled by the Federalist "midnight
judges." That particular strategy failed when the new Congress repealed the
reorganizing statute and the Supreme Court let the repeal take effect. But,
as we all know, the Federalists had another arrow in their quiver: the
appointment of John Marshall to serve as Chief Justice. Marshall's job, it
seemed, was to entrench Federalist constitutional theories and
interpretations in the Supreme Court, thereby impeding the implementation
of Jeffersonian policies.
And, as again we all know, even that strategy did not work terribly well.
True, Marshall's Court confirmed the widespread understanding that the
Supreme Court could hold national statutes unconstitutional, 30 but he and
his Court did not use that power to block any important Jeffersonian
programs. Still, as the second Justice John Marshall wrote, "the value of a
sword of Damocles is that it hangs [here, over the head of the legislature,]
not that it drops," that is, that the courts threaten invalidation even if their
threat never needs to be carried out. 3 1 And Marshall did use the judicial
power to harass Jefferson's administration, particularly in connection with
the prosecution of Aaron Burr. 32 But, in the end, the most that can be said
for the Federalist attempt at partisan entrenchment is that it led to the
adoption of doctrines of national power-a moderate nationalist
constitutionalismri--that authorized the national government to do a lot of
A robust Jeffersonian
what the Federalists hoped it would do.
constitutionalism might have looked quite different. Yet, it is not clear that
even Jeffersonian judges would have articulated a constitutionalism that
severely limited the possibilities for national power. And why would they
want to? As long as Jeffersonians controlled the political branches,
vigorous exercises of national power were likely to be rare. When they
occurred they would be in the service of Jeffersonian goals, so Jeffersonians
would hardly 33be likely to desire to find their own policies
unconstitutional.

29. For a recent detailed account, see Bruce A. Ackerman, The Failure of the Founding
Fathers: Jefferson, Marshall, and the Rise of Presidential Democracy (2005).
30. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803).
31. Arnett v. Kennedy, 416 U.S. 134, 231 (1974) (Marshall, J., dissenting).
32. For a discussion of John Marshall's role in the treason trial of Aaron Burr, see R.
Kent Newmyer, John Marshall and the Heroic Age of the Supreme Court 179-202 (2001).
33. See also Balkin & Levinson, Processes of Constitutional Change, supra note 15
(describing a similar phenomenon on recent constitutional developments).

FORDHAMLAW REVIEW

[Vol. 75

Several features of this version of partisan entrenchment should be noted.
First, the U.S. example, while dramatic, may be a bit misleading because it
involves a case in which judges were put into place as part of the strategy of
partisan entrenchment. More usually, though, the coalition about to lose
power can rely on the judges already in position, who were appointed when
that coalition's dominance was unchallenged and seemingly permanent, to
carry the coalition's policies forward.
Second, the Jeffersonian response to partisan entrenchment-eliminating
the newly created judgeships and attempting to remove one of the most
partisan of the entrenched judges-demonstrates that the new coalition in
power has resources with which to combat an attempted partisan
entrenchment. Indeed, the existence of such resources suggests that this
version of partisan entrenchment has inherent limits. The new coalition's
ability to respond or retaliate may be constrained a bit by "rule of law"
ideas, but only a bit, particularly to the extent that its leaders and supporters
34
interpret what has gone before as an attempt at partisan entrenchment.
The judges who are the vehicles for, partisan entrenchment therefore must
be careful about what they do, tempering the most aggressive actions on
35
behalf of the displaced coalition so that they can fight another day.
But, of course, that day might never come. Ackerman's account, and
indeed the general structure of this version of partisan entrenchment,
identifies a final important feature of the story, related to the second. If the
formerly dominant coalition loses power for a long time, this form of
partisan entrenchment cannot succeed permanently. Eventually the former
opposition will be in a position to place its own supporters in the courts.
So, as indeed Ackerman's account of the Marshall Court suggests, the best
the displaced coalition's leaders can hope for is that their partisans in the
courts will be able to delay and smooth out the transition between one
constitutional order and the next. 36 Except for this: Political leaders who
foresee their defeat in the next election may believe that they will return to
office soon. If they are correct, judicial delay and obstructionism can make
it possible for those political leaders to carry on as before once they come
back into power.
From the leaders' point of view, then, partisan
entrenchment is an attractive strategy. It might lead them to win in the long
run (if they return to power), and it allows them to lose gracefully (if they
do not).
When they foresee their loss of power and so consider the strategy of
partisan entrenchment in the courts, political leaders cannot know whether
34. I suspect that the unfolding story of judicial review in Israel, which is one of
Hirschl's cases, will end up illustrating these limits and constraints.
35. This has become the standard account of the Marshall Court's response to the
Jeffersonian counterattack: asserting the power of judicial review in Marbury on a
substantive issue no one cared about, and giving the repeal of the 1801 Judiciary Act a
constitutional pass in Stuart v. Laird, 5 U.S. (I Cranch) 299 (1803).
36. I take this to be one aspect of Ackerman's account of the synthetic task courts must
perform.
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their loss of power will be temporary or permanent. That uncertainty might
provoke some thought about the next step in executing the strategy. What
should the now-entrenched judges do? One might think that they ought to
obstruct the newly empowered coalition because, after all, that is what those
who appointed them had in mind. Yet, the possibility that political
coalitions will cycle into and out of power suggests that the strategy of
partisan entrenchment followed by obstructionism is unstable: Your judges
obstruct their program; when they anticipate losing power, they appoint
their own judges; those judges obstruct your program; and no one does well
at all.
Consider, then, another possibility. Of course, once normal politics takes
hold, the courts will collaborate with the dominant coalition until the next
transition looms. At that point the story becomes quite interesting. The titfor-tat strategy I have just described has its drawbacks.
The U.S.
experience with transitions generated an alternative strategy, albeit one far
more developed in theory than in practice. This is the theory generally
labeled "judicial restraint." Basically it is a theory of bi- or multilateral
disarmament. The political leadership of a currently dominant coalition
says to its opponents, "We won't appoint judges who will obstruct your
policy agenda if you manage to take control, if you promise not to appoint
judges who will obstruct our political agenda if we come back into power."
The attractiveness of this strategy depends in part, as already suggested,
on political leaders' assessment of the probability that they will be
displaced relatively soon, and in part on the mechanisms for judicial
selection. Consider first a system in which the dominant national coalition
has, for all practical purposes, unfettered choice with respect to judicial
selection. 37 In such a system, the problems with the strategy of mutual
disarmament are obvious. 3 8 First, it requires that political leaders have
time-horizons that extend not only through the electoral cycle that might
throw them out of power but also into the one that might bring them back
into power. Leaders with short time-horizons might anticipate cycling into
and out of power quickly and often, but to do so they have to regard their
immediate successes as possibly temporary. My sense is that political
leaders are typically more optimistic than that.
Second, it is entirely unclear how the mutual disarmament deal could be
enforced. Of course those now in power can comply with their promise, but
what can those currently out of power do to demonstrate that they really
will honor their promises once they take office? Third, and finally, it is not
clear that at any point it makes sense for political leaders to support mutual
disarmament. Not during periods of normal politics, because the prospect
37. Roughly, this corresponds to a majority-vote selection rule, and to the situation in
the United States, subject to a minor qualification about the possibility that minority senators
may credibly threaten to filibuster a nominee.
38. The difficulties described in the text may account for the fact that consistent
commitments to judicial restraint have been so hard to come by in the history of the U.S.
Supreme Court.
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of electoral displacement then seems quite remote. And not when the
prospect of transition is a real one, because the immediate gains from
appointing judicial allies are likely to outweigh the remote and speculative
benefits that will accrue only when the next transition occurs.
Contrast this with a selection rule giving members outside the dominant
political coalition veto power over judicial selection. The commitment to
judicial restraint can then be enforced by exercising the veto. 39 The
German selection rule, which (simplifying) requires
a two-thirds vote to
41
confirm an appointment, 40 might have this effect.
The analogy to weapons-control agreements suggests a final possibility.
During the Cold War good behavior with respect to nuclear weapons was
induced by the policy of Mutual Assured Destruction (MAD): The United
States and the Soviet Union both knew that if either misbehaved, the
consequences would be both immediate and disastrous. So, perhaps, the
best strategy for opposing political parties is to commit themselves to using
the courts as vigorously as they possibly can, with the threat that doing so
would provoke a constitutional crisis. The difference between MAD in the
arms control and judicial review contexts is this: MAD would occur almost
immediately upon misbehavior, whereas the possibility of a constitutional
crisis that seriously damages both sides seems difficult to imagine. The
analogy might be saved, a bit, by the observation that judicial appointments
tend to be spread out over a reasonably extended period. The contending
parties will frequently have allies on the courts. As a result, each side
might be in a position to provoke a constitutional crisis. That in itself might
induce a degree of restraint that could be described as an equilibrium.
Jack Balkin and Sanford Levinson have supplemented the preceding
account of partisan entrenchment by identifying another version. The
account I have sketched so far has political leaders entrenching their
supporters in the courts. Upset by Bush v. Gore,4 2 Balkin and Levinson
describe the obverse: judges entrenching their political allies in the
electoral branches. 4 3 Here the judges foresee the displacement of those
allies, and use their power to keep them in office.
I suspect that many readers will find such judicial action normatively
troubling. Consider, then, this defense: The judges believe-perhaps
correctly-that the displacement of their electoral allies is an aberrational
39. This proposition holds at least to the extent that the judges who are chosen adhere to
a commitment to judicial restraint that they demonstrate prior to appointment.
40. For the German selection rule, see Donald P. Kommers, The Constitutional
Jurisprudence of the Federal Republic of Germany 21-22 (2d ed. 1997).
41. But see supra text accompanying note 28 (suggesting that the German Constitutional
Court has engaged in relatively vigorous judicial review with respect to issues as to which
there is substantial consensus across party lines).
42. 531 U.S. 98 (2000).
43. Hirschl describes a number of other interventions by constitutional courts in the
selection of electoral officials, although he does not spell out the "partisan entrenchment"
account of such interventions (which may not be accurate with respect to some of those
interventions). Hirschl, supra note 28, at 169-210.
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departure from the "normal" course of politics. They believe, again perhaps
correctly, that they are operating within a period of normal politics, and yet
someone is about to take office who would attempt to transform those
politics, and so the constitutional order, without adequate support from the
electorate. The attempt to begin a constitutional revolution that the judges
see on the horizon lacks sufficient justification, and, from the judges' point
of view, is likely to fail, but only at some real cost to stable democracy.
Ensuring that normal
politics continues is not obviously troubling in
44
normative terms.
Bush v. Gore suggests yet another version of partisan entrenchment
driven by the courts. Elsewhere I have argued that the Rehnquist Court
brought constitutional law to the threshold of a constitutional
transformation, but did not cross that threshold. 45 The transformation was
the one sought, again unsuccessfully, by-successively-Barry Goldwater,
Ronald Reagan, and Newt Gingrich. Suppose a majority of the Supreme
Court's members believed that the increasing attractiveness of the
Goldwater-Reagan-Gingrich program to the American people foreshadowed
a successful constitutional transformation that would be thwarted once
again by the presidency of Al Gore but accomplished by the presidency of
George W. Bush. Here partisan entrenchment gives a shove to a
constitutional transformation
that is already in train, but obstructed by
46
chance political events.
One possible outcome suggested by Balkin and Levinson is that the
strategy of partisan entrenchment works for quite a long time. The courts
forestall the displacement of their political allies; their allies thus retain
power in the elected branches; the elected branches appoint new judges who
sustain the dominant coalition's policy agenda, mop up outliers, and the
like. Balkin and Levinson describe this possibility in alarmist tones. Yet,
one might wonder, how exactly is it different, other than in its inception,
from the long-term dominance of a national political coalition of the sort
that characterized Sweden, Japan, and, for that matter, the New Deal
constitutional order? Perhaps the difficulty is that partisan entrenchment
induced at the outset by judicial action can be sustained only by repeated
judicial interventions that in some sense thwart the outcomes that the people
would otherwise reach without judicial intervention. I doubt that we have
enough evidence to be confident about that proposition.

44. Given my invocation of Bush v. Gore, I should note (a) that I am not contending that
the conditions I have described were actually satisfied in 2000, and (b) that the normative
defense of this form of partisan entrenchment crucially depends on the accuracy of the
judges' beliefs about what the new occupants of electoral power are about to do.
45. Mark Tushnet, A Court Divided:
The Rehnquist Court and the Future of
Constitutional Law (2005).
46. I have toyed with the idea that this form of partisan entrenchment amounts to the
courts disciplining temporal outliers in a manner parallel to the way in which courts during
periods of normal politics discipline geographic outliers, but I have not been able to
formulate the idea clearly enough to commit myself to it.
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CONCLUSION

This Essay has indicated some of the ways in which arrays of political
power can be connected to the way constitutional courts exercise--or
refrain from exercising-the power of judicial review. The survey is
plainly incomplete. The most obvious omission is this: Suppose a nation
experiences a long period in which there is no dominant national political
coalition. Formal models of judicial behavior indicate that judges in such
periods have complete freedom to enforce whatever constitutional visions
they happen to hold. The reason is that, extraordinary circumstances
aside, 4 7 the judges' constitutional vision will be shared by enough elected
politicians to block any political response to the judges' actions. 48 Yet, it is
49
unclear to me that this formal result actually describes reality.
In addition to qualifications within each of the patterns I have described,
then, there clearly is more work to be done on the question, How do arrays
of political power relate to the exercise of judicial review? I hope, though,
that this Essay has indicated why attempting to answer that question is
likely to produce insight into the way in which constitutional law is made.

47. "Extraordinary circumstances" refer to situations where the judges' constitutional
visions are far outside the range of those held by a significant number of elected political
actors.
48. See Tushnet, supra note 10, at 33 (sketching the argument).
49. Tushnet, supra note 45 (arguing, with examples from across the domain of
constitutional law, that the formal model does not describe the Rehnquist Court's behavior).

